The notion of a continuously variable quantity can be regarded as a generalization of that of a particular (constant) quantity, and the properties of such quantities are then akin to, and derived from, the properties of constants. For example, the continuous, real-valued functions on a topological space behave like the eld of real numbers in many ways, but instead form a ring.
The main argument of this paper is as follows:
1. The distinction between the Particular and the Abstract General is present in that between the Constant and the Continuously Variable. More specially, continuous variation is a form of abstraction. 2. Higher-order logic (HOL) can be presented algebraically. As a consequence of this fact, it has continuously variable models. 3. Variable models are classical mathematical objects; namely, sheaves. 4. HOL is complete with respect to such continuously variable models.
Standard semantics appears thereby as the constant case of \no variation." In this sense, HOL is the logic of continuous variation.
The argument will be developed in four sections: (i) the algebraic formulation of HOL is given; (ii) rings of real-valued functions are considered as an example of variable structure; (iii) the idea of continuously variable sets is then discussed; and nally, (iv) it is explained how HOL is the logic of continuous variation 1 
Algebraic logic
Categorical logic can be seen as the successful completion of the program of \algebraicizing" logic begun in the 19-century. Everyone is familiar with the boolean algebra approach to propositional logic, but the treatment of quanti cation in particular has posed a serious obstacle to extending the algebraic treatment. The categorical treatment of quanti ers as adjoint functors|due to F.W. Lawvere in the 1960s|solved this problem, although it has been little appreciated until very recently.
Category theory is of course a branch of abstract algebra, but the sense in which the categorical treatment of logic is \algebraic" is deeper than just that. Rather, it is the recognition of the quanti ers|and indeed all of the logical operations|as adjoint functors that makes logic algebraic. For it is a general fact about adjoints that they always admit an algebraic description, in a de nite, technical sense. This is the same fact that makes possible the equational description of e.g. cartesian products and pairing. Figure 1 shows the (two-way) rules of inference for the rst-order logical operations expressed as adjoints. 1 HOL also includes quanti cation over \higher types" of relations, functions, properties of functions, and so on. Figure 2 indicates the basic ingredients of algebraic HOL, as it results from the adjoint analysis of these operations. The axioms consist of a handful of equations of the sort indicated, and the rules of inference are essentially substitution of equals for equals, as in elementary algebra.
It may be noted that these are all of the logical operations required; the rst-order operations are de nable from these, as suggested in gure 3 (which also indicates how even fewer would still su ce). The adjoint rules of gure 1 can then be proven.
In categorical logic we extend the treatment of propositional logic as a Y X = df ff 2 P(X Y ) j 8x9y:hx; yi 2 fg P(X) = df P X boolean algebra to HOL, by introducing the new notion of a topos. A topos is a certain kind of algebraic object (a category equipped with a certain adjoint structure) that bears the same relation to HOL as does a boolean algebra to propositional logic:
propositional logic boolean algebra = higher-order logic topos It should be emphasized that this reformulation is still equivalent to standard deductive HOL with respect to the logical formulas and consequences. We do not change the \logical theorems" but only the presentation of the logical system, replacing the machinery of formal deductive systems with elementary algebraic manipulations.
It also should be noted that we are making no use of either what the logician calls standard or Henkin semantics. Instead, from a logical point of view, we are going to specify a new kind of semantics. Indeed, the algebraic formulation just given admits continuously variable models, resulting in socalled topological semantics. This possibility results from general facts about algebraic objects and continuous variation; so it may be useful to brie y recall how it works in the familiar case of rings, before considering the new one of algebraic logic.
Rings of R-valued functions
The real numbers R form a topological space, an abelian group, a commutative ring, a complete ordered eld, and much more. ?(x 1 ; x 2 ) = (?x 1 ; ?x 2 )
Since these operations are still associative, commutative, and distributive, R R is still a ring. But the element (1; 0) 6 = 0 cannot have an inverse, since (1; 0) ?1 would have to be (1 ?1 ; 0 ?1 ). Therefore R R is not a eld.
In a similar way, one can form the more general product rings R :: : R = R n , or R I for any index-set I. Elements The main point of these examples is that one can produce rings that violate even more properties of R by passing to \continuously varying reals".
But what is a \continuously varying real number"?
Let X be a topological space. A \real number r x varying continuously over X" is just a continuous function: r : X ! R We equip these functions with the pointwise operations, as before:
The set C(X) of all such functions then forms a subring of the product ring over the index set of points jXj: C(X) R jXj But unlike the product ring, C(X) is in general not regular: C(X) 2 8f9g: f g f = f For take e.g. X = R and f(x) = x 2 , then we must have: Summarizing the lesson of these examples, we've seen that the \continu-ously varying reals" C(X) have even fewer properties of the eld of \constant" reals R than do the product rings R I . In that sense, they are closer to a general notion of \quantity". Passing from constants to continuous variation therefore \abstracts away" some properties of the constants. We note by the way that it does so without introducing any new \abstract entities". The notion of a \continuously variable set" that we seek will turn out to be that of a sheaf. First, observe that the (algebraically speci ed) logical operations can be interpreted in other \universes" of sets, e.g. in the universe of \pairs of sets":
Sets Sets
The elements have the form: Sets j = A = 0 _ 9x: x 2 A But in Sets Sets we can take (1; 0) 0 as A, and then a 2 (1; 0) means a = (a 1 ; a 2 ) with a 1 2 1 and a 2 2 0, which is impossible.
Next, just as in the case of rings, we can generalize to Sets : : : Sets = Sets n , and indeed to Sets I for any index set I, to get the \universe" of Iindexed families of sets:
These families again model HOL, but they have still fewer properties of Sets.
However, all such \product universes" do satisfy e.g. the axiom of choice. To nd even more general \universes" that violate it, we can consider even more general families of sets:
varying continuously over an arbitrary space X. (This generalizes the case where the set I in the previous example is regarded as a discrete space). But what should a \continuously varying set" be? The problem is that we cannot simply take a \continuous set-valued function" Thus we've seen that HOL can be modeled in various \universes" other than Sets. In particular, the \universe" of all sets varying continuously over a space models HOL, where the notion of a continuously varying set is reasonably taken as that of a sheaf. Moreover, sheaves violate some properties of sets.
The logic of continuous variation
It's time to be more precise about the notion of a \universe". We've seen that only a few constructions are required to model HOL: 0; A B; P(A); a 2 A; : : :
A topos is de ned as a category equipped with adjoint structure corresponding to these operations (see 6]). In this sense, a topos is a \universe of abstract sets". It's worth noting the following theorem, which just says that we have the de nition right.
Theorem. (Topos completeness of HOL)
A sentence of HOL is provable i it is true in every topos model. Given the foregoing discussion, it should come as no surprise to learn that the categories Sets; Sets Sets; Sets I are toposes. Moreover, the category Sh(X) of all sheaves of sets on a space X is also a topos. The topos Sh(X) of sheaves consists of sets F x varying continuously in a parameter x 2 X. The logic of the constant sets is quite strong; the logic of variable sets is much weaker. Fewer things are true of variable sets in general than are true of constant ones (think of the di erence between the eld of real numbers and the ring of real-valued functions) What is the logic of continuously varying sets? That is, which formulas of HOL are true in all sheaf models? The answer is given by the following theorem from 2]:
Theorem. Logic of sheaves = classical deductive HOL.
The proof of this fact uses recent, non-trivial results in topos theory. 2 The sheaf-theory on which it rests 3] is rooted in geometry, not logic. It is worth emphasizing that, unlike the preceding theorem, there is no obvious reason why this one needs to be true. Sheaves are classical mathematical objects, and their logical properties depend on continuous variation, not deduction. HOL is a classical deductive system going back to Frege and Russell and having nothing to do with continuity. That these things should coincide is remarkable.
Note that the G odel incompleteness of deductive higher-order logic can be easily understood in these terms: G odel's \true but unprovable" involves only \true of all constant sets" but not \true of all variable sets" A \true but unprovable" G odel sentence is therefore true only of constant sets, not of all variable ones.
Thus, summing up, we see that fewer things are true of all continuously varying sets than of all constant ones. HOL captures just those statements that are \variably true". Precisely: HOL is deductively complete with respect to topological semantics, which is the real statement of the second theorem mentioned above.
